JULY 2, 2014
ISIS the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham (Levant), has burst dramatically onto the Iraqi scene
in recent weeks, as it has captured one town after another. It has brought a
substantial part of the north of Iraq under its control and come to within
100km of the capital, Baghdad.
But these
developments should not have been surprising. Iraq — and Isis — have been
heading in this direction for a while.
Isis is a transnational,
militant Sunni group which wants to mobilise Islamic ideals for the creation of
what it deems an Islamic state, or caliphate, within the Middle East. It
developed out of an earlier entity, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), but is at odds with
the leadership of Al-Qaeda since it rejects the authority represented by Osama
bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
AQI developed in the
aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq against the Ba’ath regime headed
by Saddam Hussein. However, over time, its guerrilla tactics were rejected by
many Sunnis in a counterterrorism campaign known as the Sahwa (Awakening).
Even during that
early stage, AQI developed differences with Bin Laden and Zawahiri over its
methods of indiscriminately attacking fellow Muslims. After its leader, Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, was killed in a US air strike in 2006, the group adopted its
second moniker, Islamic State of Iraq, in order to improve its waning appeal
within the Iraqi Sunnis.
Its latest label,
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, was adopted in 2012, under the leadership of
Abu Baqr al-Baghdadi, to represent its combined goals in Syria and Iraq. The
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and the start of the Syrian crisis in 2011
rejuvenated Isis’ appeal within the world of transnational Muslim militancy.
Subsequently,
Baghdadi helped form the now official Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat
al-Nusra (JN), under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Golani.
Baghdadi and Golani
eventually differed over the question of ultimate leadership. Despite mediation
attempts , the groups could not reconcile and JN joined a larger formation of
Islamist rebels in Syria, the Islamic Front, which decided to attack Isis. This
also signalled its exit from the larger fold of militants gathered under the
Al-Qaeda umbrella.
This condensed
history of Isis highlights the constantly shifting alliances that plague this
organisation. Its disagreements, especially over questions of leadership and
dealings with Muslims who do not agree with its understanding of Islam, also point
to the utopian nature of its eventual goal of an Islamic state.
It is a highly
abstract ideal which can, in the short run, bring together many groups who are
disgruntled with their immediate authorities, such as the government in
Baghdad, or the earlier US-led occupation.
But, in bringing
together such diversity, Isis also has the potential to self-destruct, due to
the contradictions present within such groups. This is what happened with AQI
when it alienated Sunnis who became part of the Sahwa.
To what extent and
with what speed this process will repeat itself remains to be seen. There are
signs that Isis has learnt from its past mistakes.
Along with engaging
in a range of social development programmes in the areas it controls, it has
also appointed Saddam-era military men as the governors of these regions.
Additionally, it is rumoured that Isis is restricting itself to military
operations, leaving the affairs of the conquered cities in the hands of their
people.
However, even if
these reports are true, in the long run, Isis cannot just operate as a militia,
fighting off government troops. It has an ideology that influences its strategy
and tactics.
For example, its
vision of governance was outlined in the city charter it released in Mosul.
This document makes it clear that Isis will enforce Muslim rituals like the
five daily prayers, along with its understanding of Islamic dress codes and
punitive measures. Similarly, it forbids the use of drugs, alcohol and
cigarettes, and the carrying of weapons, non-Isis flags and insignia.
Such moves are not
likely to sit well with the tribal and Ba’athist groups it is allied with.
Another significant factor that is likely to divide Isis and its local allies
concerns its desire to march on Baghdad and areas further south, actions that
are likely to invite military intervention from Iran and the US.
Local Sunnis, on the
other hand, might prefer to negotiate federalist autonomy for regions under
their control without threatening Baghdad directly. It is also unlikely that
these groups will pay allegiance to Baghdadi as the undisputed caliph (leader)
of the region under their control.
The rise of Isis in
Iraq is tenuous at best. Its history, ideology and strategy do not promise
stable and lasting territorial gains.
For now, many Iraqi
Sunnis might be willing to support Isis against the authoritarian Iraqi
government. But, if more reconciliatory and inclusive leaders are able to
replace him, as recent reports seem to suggest, Isis will find itself
marginalised.
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