Asia’s New Geopolitics Takes Shape Around India, Japan and Australia
Japan, India, and Australia will be
instrumental in determining Asia’s fate in the 21st century.
New
configurations in Asian geopolitics are emerging thick and fast. Last month saw
the initiative of a new trilateral involving India, Japan, and Australia when
Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar met his Australian counterpart and the
Japanese vice foreign minister. Japan will also be a part of bilateral
India-U.S. annual naval exercises–the Malabar–slated to be held over the next
few months. Though Japan has participated in these exercises in the past as
well, this will be only the second time when Japan will join these exercises in
the geostrategically critical Indian Ocean region.
There
is a growing convergence in the region now that the strategic framework of the
Indo-Pacific remains the best way forward to manage the rapidly shifting
contours of Asia. Proposed first by Japan and adopted with enthusiasm by
Australia under the Tony Abbott government, in particular, the framework has
gained considerable currency, with even the U.S. now increasingly articulating
the need for it. Though China views the framework with suspicion, many in China
are acknowledging that the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a critical regional
space for India and China needs to synchronize its policies across the Indian
Ocean region and the Pacific.
These
developments underscore the changing regional configuration in the Indo-Pacific
on account of China’s aggressive foreign policy posture as well as a new
seriousness in India’s own China policy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s
outreach to Japan and Australia has been a significant part of his government’s
foreign policy so far as strong security ties with Tokyo and Canberra are now
viewed as vital by Delhi.
China’s
increasing diplomatic and economic influence, coupled with domestic
nationalistic demands, has led to an adjustment of its military power and the
adoption of a bolder and more proactive foreign policy. From China’s unilateral
decision in 2013 to extend its
air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over a contested
maritime area in the East China Sea overlapping with the already existing
Japanese ADIZ to announcing new fishing regulations for Hainan province in
January 2014 to ensure that all foreign vessels need fishing permits from
Hainan authorities to operate in more than half of South China Sea, the list of
assertive moves has been growing in recent years. China’s land reclamation work
in the Spratly Islands has been the most dramatic affirmation of Beijing’s
desire to change the ground realities in the region in its favor. This has
generated apprehensions about a growing void in the region to balance China’s
growing dominance.
With
the U.S. consumed by its own domestic vulnerabilities and never ending crises
in the Middle East, regional powers such as India, Japan, and Australia have
been more proactive than in the past in managing this turbulence. The new
trilaterals emerging in Asia go beyond past attempts at rudimentary joint
military exercises. In December 2013, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF) conducted its first bilateral maritime exercise with the Indian Navy in
the Indian Ocean Region. With growing strategic convergence between the
two, in 2014 India invited the JMSDF to participate in the annual Malabar
exercises with the U.S. Navy in the Pacific waters.
India
and Japan have an institutionalized trilateral strategic dialogue partnership
with the United States, initiated in 2011. Maintaining a balance of power in
the Asian-Pacific as well as maritime security in the Indo-Pacific waters has
become an important element of this dialogue. A similar dialogue exists between
the U.S., Japan, and Australia. And now a new trilateral involving India,
Japan, and Australia has joined these initiatives, which can potentially to
transform into a ‘quad’ of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region. The roots of
this potential partnership were laid as early as late-2004, when navies from
the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia collaborated in tsunami relief operations
all across the Indian Ocean.
Japan
was one of the earliest vocal supporters of such initiatives. In 2007, Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in his earlier stint as prime minister, lobbied for
Asia’s democracies to come together in a ‘quadrilateral.’ This was also
actively supported by the United States. Such an initiative resulted in a five
nation naval exercise in Bay of Bengal in September 2007. However, China,
perceiving a possible ganging-up of Asia’s democracies, issued demarches to New
Delhi and Canberra, causing this initiative to lose steam, since both Australia
and New Delhi felt it unwise to provoke China. However, as China becomes more
aggressive in the region, there are signs that India and Australia may be
warming up to the idea again.
The
uncertainty of Chinese power and intentions in the region as well as the future
of American commitment to maintaining the balance of power in Asia rank high in
the strategic thinking of regional powers. This rapidly evolving regional
geopolitics is forcing Asia’s middle powers – India, Japan and Australia – to
devise alternative strategies for balancing China. Though still continuing
their security partnership with the United States, these powers are actively
hedging against the possibility of America’s failure to eventually balance
China’s growing power. Asia’s geopolitical space is undergoing a
transformation. While China’s rise is the biggest story still unfolding, other
powers are also recalibrating and their influence will be of equal, if not
greater, consequence in shaping the future of global politics in the
Asia-Pacific.
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