Flashback to
1965, JAVED HUSAIN
FLUSHED with victory in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, Field Marshal
Ayub Khan and his confidants thought that the time was ripe for wresting
Kashmir from India by inciting the Muslim population to rise in rebellion
against the occupying power, and then delivering the knockout blow by severing
the road link between India and Kashmir at Akhnur.
On the night of Aug 5/6 1965, 5,000 lightly armed men slipped across the
ceasefire line into occupied Kashmir. They were the Gibraltar Force. While the
surprise lasted, they conducted a series of spectacular operations. Then the
expected happened. Indian retribution against Muslim villages was swift and
brutal; as a result, the locals not only refused to cooperate with the raiders
but also started to assist the Indian forces to flush them out. To make matters
worse, the Indian forces went on the offensive capturing Kargil, Haji Pir pass
and Tithwal and threatening Muzaffarabad. With its fate sealed, the Gibraltar
force disintegrated. In order to release the pressure being applied on Azad
Kashmir, Phase 2 was launched.
In the early hours of Sept 1, 1965, the sudden thunder of 100 artillery
guns stunned the Indian troops in Chhamb and heralded the opening of Operation
Grand Slam. As Pakistani armour advanced rapidly towards Akhnur the Indian
defences crumbled. Instead of exploiting this, the operation was suddenly
stopped to effect the infamous change of command.
Pakistan was saved
by the valour of its jawans, junior officers and air force.
In the process 36
precious hours were lost, enabling the Indians to reinforce the area. When it
was resumed it was unable to develop momentum and was terminated when India
opened up the Lahore front on Sept 6. Maj Gen Joginder Singh, then chief of
staff of Western Command, in his book Behind the Scene writes, “The enemy came
to our rescue.”
On Sept 8, 1965, the Indians launched their main offensive in Sialkot
sector after crossing the Ravi at Madhopur Headworks. These headworks connect
India to occupied Kashmir. In order to retrieve the situation, the field
marshal played his trump card - the First Armoured Division. On Sept 8, it was
launched in a counteroffensive to sever the Indian lines of communication
serving their forces in the Lahore, Sialkot and Kashmir sectors, by seizing the
main bridges on River Beas, east of Amritsar.
The counteroffensive made a brilliant start, yet, barely 36 hours later,
it ended in disaster and was terminated. The reason was that instead of sending
the logistics forward, the units were called back to rearm and refuel at
nightfall on Sept 8 and 9. This gave a 24-hour respite to the Indians which
enabled them to reinforce the area. On Sept 10 when the units advanced yet
again, they encountered lethal fire by enemy tanks and anti-tank guns from the
front and flanks.
The field marshal was no longer master of the situation and the Indians
failed to exploit this. Both in Sialkot and the Lahore sectors, they were
unable to overcome the defences as they kept attacking frontally and kept
getting repulsed. Their senior leadership was as inept as their Pakistani
counterparts.
In the final analysis, the valour of its jawans and junior officers, the
clinical efficiency of its artillery and the daring exploits of its air force
saved Pakistan.
Pakistan cannot afford to surrender time, space and initiative to the
enemy, more so when it lacks depth and when the enemy enjoys superiority in
resources. If it does, its limited military assets will invariably get consumed
in defensive battles. The strategy of pre-emption is thus imposed on Pakistan
in the same way it is imposed on Israel. Therefore, once the decision was taken
to raise the stakes, the high command should have known that Operation
Gibraltar would evoke a strong response and Operation Grand Slam, even a
stronger one. They should, therefore, have planned to fight the 1965 war, which
they had provoked, on their own terms.
Consequently, Gibraltar should have been followed up 24 hours later by
Grand Slam along with another offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor to capture
Madhopur Headworks on the Ravi, and the area west of it. The Ravi could then
have been flooded by releasing water in it from the headworks to preclude a
counteroffensive by the Indians across it — their only option then would have been
to launch the main offensive against Lahore from the direction of Amritsar and
Khem Karan, east and south of Lahore respectively.
The destruction of Harike Headworks on the Beas/ Sutlej rivers and the
main bridges on River Beas by the SSG on the same night as Grand Slam and the
accompanying offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor were launched, would have
further curtailed the Indian operational options.
The field marshal had squandered away the opportunity to take Kashmir —
“In war opportunities come but once, the great art is to seize them”
(Napoleon).
The writer is a former armour and SSG officer.
Published in Dawn, September 6th, 2015
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