The Implications of the
Taliban’s Spring Offensive on Afghanistan, by Abdul
Basit April
22, 2016
It’s shaping up to be a tough few months for
Afghanistan’s increasingly beleaguered government.
On April
12, the Afghan Taliban announced the launch of their annual spring offensive in
Afghanistan: “Operation Omari.” The spring offensive has been named after the
movement’s late founder Mullah Muhammad Omar. Ahead of the offensive, the
statement on the Taliban’s website mentioned the use of large-scale attacks
against government positions, while employing a combination of hit-and-run
assaults and suicide attacks in urban areas. And indeed this week a major blast in Kabul killed
at least 64 people.
This
year’s fighting season will determine the future trajectory of the Afghan
conflict, as civil war looks imminent.
While
there was no lull in the fighting in Afghanistan throughout 2015, the
announcement of the spring offensive could signal a further escalation of
violence, accelerating the country’s destabilization. Since the
withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan in 2014, the Taliban have
grown from strength to strength, despite initial setbacks emanating from the
disclosure of their leader Mullah Omar’s death in July last year. Last year’s
violence left 11,000 civilians dead across Afghanistan.
The
launch of the spring offensive by the Taliban is a major setback for the
fledgling peace process in Afghanistan. A Quadrilateral Coordination Group
(QCG), comprising China, the U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan was created in December last year in Islamabad to revive the stalled
peace talks between Afghan government and the Taliban. The QCG held four
meetings – two in Islamabad and two in Kabul – but failed to overcome
differences on the operational details of negotiations. Notwithstanding these
differences, the QCG was hoping to hold the first direct meeting between Kabul
and Taliban in April. However, the spring offensive has dashed hopes that a
political solution will be found to the Afghan conflict.
Right
from the outset, irreconcilable differences existed between Kabul and the
Afghan Taliban – differences that made the peace process a non-starter. For
instance, the Taliban unequivocally demanded the release of prisoners, removal
from the UN’s sanctions list, the easing of travel bans, and recognition of the
Qatar office as the Taliban’s official political office for peace talks. In
contrast, the Afghan government called for condition-free peace talks, arguing
that the demands should be discussed during talks. Second, the Taliban wanted a
timeframe from the Afghan government for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Afghanistan, something Kabul was not ready to grant (under the Bilateral
Security Agreement, U.S. troops can stay in Afghanistan until the end of 2024).
Finally, Kabul aimed at reaching a power sharing agreement with the Taliban in
exchange for a cessation of violence and the Taliban’s recognition of the
Afghan government and constitution. In contrast, the Taliban saw peace talks as
one means, among others, to return to power.
The
Taliban has been buoyed by last year’s military victories in Afghanistan. The
senior leadership of the Taliban has defied the pressure of Pakistan’s powerful
military establishment by plainly refusing to talk to Kabul. By doing so, they
have emerged out of the shadows of Pakistani military’s dictates and have done
much to dispell their image as a proxy.
Ahead of
the spring offensive, the new Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansoor has emerged as
the legitimate and undisputed leader of the militant movement. Masnoor has not
only succeeded in stitching up the cracks that emerged within the group
following the disclosure of Mullah Omar’s death, but has also succeeded in
shifting the momentum of battlefield victories into a nuanced political
narrative in the eyes of the Afghan populace. The recent inclusion of Mullah
Qayum Zakir, an influential military commander, along with Mullah Mannan and
Mullah Yaqoob, the brother and elder son of Mullah Omar, will further
strengthen the Taliban’s military position and dispel the impression of
internal disputes and weaknesses. The leader of the Haqqani network, Sirajuddin
Haqqani, has played an important role in bridging these differences. More
importantly, several influential commanders and fighters of IS-Khurasan, the
local ISIS affiliate, have re-joined the Taliban. The Mehsud faction of the
Pakistani Taliban has also merged its fighters with the Afghan Taliban.
Continuing
last year’s strategy, the Afghan Taliban is launching operations in both the
south and north of the country, to stretch out the Afghan security forces. The
focus of this spring offensive will be on capturing more territory to
strengthen their position and expose the weaknesses of the Afghan government.
The
spring offensive will have a direct impact on Afghanistan’s relations with its
neighbor Pakistan. As the fighting escalates, the blame game between Kabul and
Islamabad will intensify. The Afghan government will try to exert pressure on
Pakistan through the international community and the U.S. to act against
Taliban sanctuaries on its soil. Specific demands could include arresting top
Taliban leaders or chasing them out of Pakistan.
The
escalation of conflict in Afghanistan will also have negative fallout at the
global level. It will result in a flow of Afghan migrants to European
countries, which are already grappling with a flood of refugees from Syria.
Given the uncertainty surrounding its future and growing unemployment,
Afghanistan is experiencing a rapidly worsening brain drain. The deterioration
of the situation in Afghanistan will also put pressure on the international
community to increase their financial contributions to keep the U.S.-backed
Afghan government afloat.
The
diminishing hopes of a political settlement of the Afghan conflict with defiant
Taliban posturing has increased the prospect that Afghanistan will once again
slide into chaos. If it does, a lingering conflict will become a festering
wound for the region.
Abdul
Basit is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies.
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