Thursday, 2 October 2014

Divisions Could Weaken US Led Coalition in Iraq and Syria

Divisions Could Weaken US Led Coalition in Iraq and Syria
SEPTEMBER 29, 2014 | 1439  Print  Text Size 

Summary
Over the past week, the U.S.-led coalition carrying out airstrikes against Islamic State positions in Iraq and Syria has expanded to include several new members. This has enhanced its overall combat power and spread the burden more equitably. The British parliament voted Sept. 26 to join the group and has already commenced airstrikes over Iraq. Denmark and Belgium also decided to participate in direct combat operations. These new partners join two European peers, France and the Netherlands, as well as Australia. Notably, these six countries have chosen to restrict their combat roles to Iraq. This contrasts with the role of the United States' five Arab partners — Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates — which have been carrying out airstrikes with the United States in Syria since operations expanded there Sept. 23.

This odd division of labor does not operate in the interest of efficiency but is instead an artifact of the complicated and juxtaposed reality on the ground and in the political arena. The battleground against the Islamic State is ostensibly divided between the sovereign states of Iraq and Syria. In reality, however, it is a single space spread over what has become an imaginary border. The divided coalition reflects the members' divergent political views on how to manage the respective situations of Iraq and Syria. Ultimately, the arrangement artificially separates what should be treated as a single battlefield and a single enemy. This weakens the coalition, confuses desired outcomes and often limits operations to what will appease all members.
Analysis
The coalition's division of the battle space into two parts has already led to differences in target selection. Since earlier limited U.S. operations in Iraq expanded into Syria, the United States and Arab coalition members have focused on critical infrastructure in Syria that supports Islamic State operations in Syria and Iraq. This has included command centers, finance operations, supply depots and, most recently, oil refineries. The coalition's strategy in Syria has been to degrade the Islamic State's military capabilities through destruction or disruption of the critical assets that support it.

The strategy in Iraq, however, has been quite different. There, the focus of air campaigns has been to buttress ground operations. This has translated into close air support for Kurdish peshmerga and national government forces, as well as strikes aimed at destroying Islamic State military supplies, vehicles and heavy weapons used in operations against those forces. This divergence stems in part from the different tactical situations in each country: In Iraq the coalition is operating in direct coordination with local forces, whereas in Syria efforts to facilitate anti-Islamic State ground attacks are in the early stages, with only the first steps having been taken to train Syrian anti-regime rebels in Saudi Arabia.

But these disparate tactical realities are only part of the picture. The primary differences between these operations are explained by the imperatives of the partners operating in Iraq and in Syria. The United States' Sunni Arab partners have an interest in participating in the operations against the Islamic State in Syria. Degrading the Islamic State's capabilities there takes pressure off of anti-regime rebels currently fighting Damascus and Islamic State forces simultaneously. The United States' reliance on support from these Sunni Arab countries, however, presents the risk that the core mission in Syria will be stretched in two different directions. The United States aims to cripple the Islamic State without directly targeting Syrian President Bashar al Assad. The Sunni Arab states, though, want to dislodge al Assad's Iran-friendly regime and weaken the position of Lebanese-based Shiite militant group Hezbollah, which is assisting the Syrian government.
Risks to Cohesion
For their part, Australia and the coalition's European members have a different set of interests from their Arab partners. Because a large number of Islamic State foreign fighters originated in Europe, these governments fear that the militants could at some point return home and threaten national security. The Islamic State has also taken European hostages and continues to be a source for radicalization inside Europe. This means that these states have compelling reasons for carrying out strikes against the Islamic State regardless of its area of operation. All six of these powers, however, have chosen not to operate over Syria without a clear mandate from the United Nations. In European countries especially, military intervention is a touchy political subject; approval for any type of direct involvement typically requires the support of parliament, putting tight electoral constraints on such operations. These limits are less severe in the case of Iraq, where the coalition is delivering assistance to a host nation requesting help rather than conducting a military intervention in a country without coordinating with its government.

The division of the coalition into two separate areas does not necessarily limit its military capabilities, but it does pose serious risks to its cohesion and, by extension, its ability to sustain effective operations over Syria in particular. Because of the Arab states' direct interest in the outcome of the Syrian civil war, they may try to push the United States toward extending air operations to targets of the al Assad regime. This is something the United States is unwilling to do, in part because it would carry a much higher logistical cost. But if such a disagreement were to threaten operations over Syria, the Europeans' reluctance to extend their own activities into Syria would seriously limit the coalition. The United States would also risk being perceived as the sole actor on the Syrian side of the battle, rather than part of an international coalition, and this could result in significant blowback on the ground. At the same time, disagreements on the scope of operations in Syria could also constrain the effectiveness of strikes by limiting the target set to the bare minimum to which all parties can agree.
As it stands, the U.S.-led coalition is fragile. When something is this delicate and complicated, it is hard to take the decisive action required to degrade and contain a dynamic opponent such as the Islamic State.

Pakistan terms Kashmir a legal issue, demands plebiscite

Pakistan terms Kashmir a legal issue, demands plebiscite
Pakistan on Thursday asserted that Kashmir is a “legal issue” and must be resolved through plebiscite as per the aspirations of the Kashmiri people.
At the weekly briefing in Islamabad, Foreign Office spokesperson Tasnim Aslam also made it clear that India-Pakistan talks were not a substitute to the U.N. resolutions on Kashmir which envisage plebiscite in the region.
“Kashmir is a legal issue also and its legal position demands that the dispute must be resolved as per the aspirations of Kashmiri people through plebiscite,” she said.
Ms. Aslam said that Simla Agreement between the two countries does not make U.N. resolutions ineffective.
Her remarks come within days of Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif raking up the Kashmir issue at the U.N. General Assembly where he said the U.N. had passed resolutions to hold a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir more than six decades ago.
“The people of Jammu and Kashmir are still waiting for the fulfilment of that promise,” Mr. Sharif said.
India had strongly rejected the “untenable comments” made by Mr. Sharif, asserting that the people of the State have peacefully chosen their destiny in accordance with universally accepted democratic principles.
Speaking at the UNGA, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had offered to engage in a serious bilateral dialogue “without the shadow of terrorism” while asking Pakistan to create an “appropriate environment” for that.
At Thursday’s briefing, Ms. Aslam also claimed that India never responded positively on Pakistan's proposals to resolve the Siachen issue and for declaring Siachen a Peace Park including demilitarisation of the territory.
The Foreign Office spokesperson termed that Indian policy towards resolution of Siachen as “inflexible”.
Former President Pervez Musharraf had claimed that Pakistan and India were close to clinching a deal on Siachen during his tenure. Ms. Aslam said India and Pakistan would have to resume talks for the sake of sustainable peace in the region.
India had called off Foreign Secretary-level talks in August after Pakistan's High Commissioner in New Delhi Abdul Basit had met Kashmiri separatist leaders ahead of the meeting, ignoring India's warning that the move could derail the parleys.Ms. Aslam saw nothing wrong in Mr. Basit’s meeting with Hurriyat leaders, saying Pakistan regularly consults with them.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/pakistan-terms-kashmir-a-legal-issue-demands-plebiscite/article6468376.ece

Punjabi Lecturers and ISI man abused Kashmiri student girls in Muzaffarabad

London         02 October 2014
It is sad to note that our Kashmiri daughters and sisters are systematically abused by Pakistani secret agency officials and Punjabi teaching staff in Muzaffarabad.

According to details provided by Ifzal Suleria, President of Kashmir National Party, Pakistani Administered Kashmir, Professor Majeed Niazi from Pakistani Punjab and three other Lecturers from the same region are involved in the scandal. They deliberately target innocent female students and award them low marks that they could be manipulated and blackmailed to fulfil their satanic desires.

This matter was brought to the attention of the University officials by a famous NSF leader Kamran Baig last year; but the University officials decided to take no action against the culprits because of pressure from some quarters.

People belonging to the secret agency of Pakistan are also involved in abusing and harassing female Kashmiri girls. Wasim Malik, Chairman of Kashmir Students Federation told me that these Punjabi Professors deliberately give poor marks to the Kashmiri girls, and then their details are passed on to the Secret agencies who promise them to help them to get higher marks and a scholarship. By this method they trap innocent girls who are systematically abused by these evil men.

Wasim Malik said, this time the girl in question was asked by the ISI man to meet her that he could get her marks increased and get her a scholarship. The girl was innocent, but she belonged to a decent family, and after discussing it with other students she invited the ISI man in the university where he was caught by students and beaten up.

Student leaders like Zubair Mir, Tahir Mir, Farooq Ahmed and others, after beating the culprit, took away his mobile phone and presented him to SSP Irfan Masood Kashfi. To surprise of these student leaders, SSP Irfan Masood did not take any action against the culprit even though evidence was there in the form of his messages to the girl from his mobile. SSP was very polite and subservient to the accused man and was very harsh with the students.

Later on SSP Irfan Masood got Deputy Commissioner Masood Rehman involved in this matter. Masood Rehman is a former JKLF man, but after getting his job he is more loyal to Islamabad than the Pakistanis; and makes every effort to harass and intimidate Kashmiri nationalists. After some consultations they honourably let the ISI man go. However, they warned the student leaders to behave themselves otherwise they will have to pay a big price.

KNP leader, Ifzal Suleria strongly condemned this action of the ISI man, and the subservient Kashmir officials; and demanded that the culprits must be punished and all the Pakistani criminals who are employed here or stationed here to intimidate local people must be sent back to Pakistan.

Abbas Butt Chairman of the KNP and Dr Shabir Choudhry also condemned this shameful act, demanded that the culprits must be apprehended and punished. They said we want all the Lent Officers and other Pakistanis who are employed here or stationed here to be sent back to Pakistan. We don’t want their services, as honour and dignity of our girls is more important to us. They said people of Azad Kashmir must realise that they are not azad in any sense of the word. They are occupied by Islamabad and they treat us like an occupied territory.

*

 

Issued by Dr Shabir Choudhry


Tuesday, 30 September 2014

PM MODI SPELLS OUT HIS VISION – ANALYSIS, By Manoj Joshi

PM MODI SPELLS OUT HIS VISION – ANALYSIS, By Manoj Joshi

In the past month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sketched out the broad contours of his foreign and security policy vision, culminating in his official visit to the United States. For most Americans, this would have been yet another visit by an important global leader. But for most Indians, both in the US and back home, there has been a palpable sense of excitement about it.
This is because of the understanding that Modi is the first prime minister since 1989 to have a majority of his own in the Lok Sabha.
Most of us have lived with the frustration of coalition governments which were not able to take the decisive decisions that this country needs to get its act together to act as the economic and regional power that it already is. In foreign policy, as in domestic, Modi has raised expectations sky-high. As of now, however, what we are seeing in both domestic and foreign policy are broad brush-strokes, not the finished picture.
Consolidation
In Modi’s case, this has worked at two levels. First is the inspirational and global, delivered through public speeches such as those at the UN or Madison Square Garden. The UN speech spelt out his world view: the importance of being a good neighbour, peace with Pakistan, the dangers of terrorism, the need for accommodative trading systems and a multipolar world order. The second level is the behind-the-scenes realism which has been manifested by the stance India has taken with its interlocutors, whether they be Pakistan, China, US or Japan on issues ranging from the peace talks, border, climate change, and nuclear agreements.
But what we are seeing are only the opening gambits of a longer game. Foreign policy is a bit different from domestic. Within a country, you can influence, dictate or direct an outcome with relative ease. But in foreign affairs, it is not easy to shape things in the way you want.
So far, Modi has been careful in articulating his foreign and security policy. His primary political aim is consolidation. As an outlier, he needs to ensure that he is now the BJP’s mainstream. He may be the “hriday samrat” (emperor of minds) of the public, but within the party he still faces opposition and resistance.
In these circumstances, he will move slowly and not undertake policy measures – foreign or domestic – which could give his enemies a handle. His initial strategy, much like that of Narasimha Rao, will be change through stealth. A lot of that is already visible in economic policy and administration. In foreign and security policy, from the outset he has hewn close to the Vapayee mould. He may have been tough with Pakistan, but he has ignored fire-eaters who want him to do more. He has refused calls to change the nuclear doctrine, invoking Vajpayee.
And, if Atalji termed the US as its “natural ally”, Modi modified it only slightly to term it as a “natural global partner.”
Articulation
But at some point, he needs to prepare for the day when his interlocutors will ask: What do you bring to the table? In another context, in August, President Obama put it bluntly when he commented that China has been a free rider on the international system for the last thirty years or so. The question also needs to be posed to India, which often talks of “non-alignment” and “strategic autonomy.”
Is India also free-riding on the world system where the US provides security to or oil sea lanes, or takes on the Islamist challenge in the Middle-East?
While India was poor and weak, we could always look away at some of these issues, but if India’s economy grows in the next decade, we may have to provide some answers to the questions, in our own self interest. So, beyond the broad geopolitical formulations, what many of these countries and China, are wondering, is: What is the role India intends to play in the coming decade – which politically is likely to be the Modi decade? Actually they wonder what role is India capable of playing. Capability here, is a combination of capacity – military and economic – as well as intentions articulated through policy.
Potential
As of now, all that India brings to the table is its potential. In the present circumstances, this is a big plus. The global balance of power is inexorably shifting in favour of China.
Under pressure in the East and South China Sea, the US and its allies want India to rise so as to counter some of China’s pull.
Given the asymmetry between Indian and Chinese military and economic power, India cannot do this by itself, but in combination with others it can. So Modi needs to unpack India’s new foreign and security policies in a world where the US is becoming more selective about its global role, while China is feeling its way around to see how it can shape regional and global policy using its still growing economic and military clout.
Modi is right to emphasise the fact that our destiny will be our neighbourhood, but it also lies in the reshaping and reform of our economic and national security structures to keep pace with what we hope will be a burgeoning economy.
Given the ground realities – where China’s power exceeds ours by orders of magnitude – we need allies. That is where relationships with the US, Japan, ASEAN and Australia come in.
Beyond the hype, high table banquets, joint statements and the like, this is what the Modi vision that the global foreign policy community is searching for.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation and Contributing Editor, Mail Today)


MODI - FORGING NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITH WASHINGTON, By Sumit Ganguly

MODI - FORGING NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITH WASHINGTON
By Sumit Ganguly
It was perhaps fitting that India’s newly elected prime minister would be asked to define his approach to global and strategic issues during his maiden appearance at the United Nations and, later, during his first meeting with US President Barack Obama. Following that meeting, the two men drafted a joint statement in the form of an op-ed. The agenda for cooperation that they have spelled out is hardly modest: It seeks to address issues ranging from countering climate change to terrorism. Until now, Modi’s focus has been on domestic issues and regional problems. India’s global role and strategic ambitions ultimately depend on his ability to deliver at home.
During his election campaign, he infrequently raised foreign policy issues. These were mostly confined to regional security and ongoing issues involving India’s neighbors, Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China and Pakistan. On Bangladesh, he highlighted illegal immigration; on the PRC he decried the country’s “expansionist attitude”; and on Pakistan he raised the familiar matter of its support for terror. Beyond these concerns, he offered a speech extolling Japan’s economic success and the need to attract Japanese investment to India.
The bulk of his campaign rhetoric instead focused on placing India on a path to economic growth and prosperity. Fulfilling that promise requires a robust foreign policy.
Since assuming office in May, Modi has visited Japan, hosted China’s President Xi Jinping in New Delhi and just wrapped up a visit to the United States. The visit to Japan, though mostly successful and conducted with much fanfare, failed to yield a crucial nuclear agreement. Such talks began three years ago, but were suspended after the 2011 Fukushima disaster. India hopes to access Japanese technology for nuclear power, but reservations run deep in Japan over non-proliferation and nuclear safety.
Xi’s visit proved to be far more fraught. Even as his Chinese interlocutor was in the country, the People’s Liberation Army once again chose to make a series of incursions along a disputed section of the Sino-Indian border in Ladakh. PRC apologists were inclined to dismiss the incursions as the result of bureaucratic wrangling within China – a convenient but unrealistic argument. On its own, the PLA would not dare embarrass the leader of the Communist Party. Accordingly, it is reasonable to surmise that the PLA’s actions in Ladakh had enjoyed the president’s imprimatur.
The episode was hardly an isolated incident. For the past several years, the PLA had routinely conducted limited probes along the disputed border. The timing of this particular occurrence was simply more infelicitous. Indeed, despite Xi’s offer to invest upwards of $20 billion in India over the next several years, the relationship remains troubled. The border dispute, despite endless diplomatic palaver, is no closer to a resolution. Sino-Indian trade, though approaching $60 billion is imbalanced. Not only is it in the PRC’s favor, but India mostly exports raw materials to the country while importing a range of consumer and industrial goods.
Beyond these features of the bilateral relationship, the two sides are wary of each other’s presence in Southeast Asia, with differing positions on the maritime disputes in the South China Sea and carefully watching the other’s involvement in India’s immediate neighborhood. Furthermore, both sides view their ties to the United States as a critical issue in their own bilateral relations. India frets about a possible Sino-American condominium along the lines that Zbigniew Brzezinski had once suggested, which briefly enjoyed favor among some policymaking circles in the first Obama administration. The PRC, in turn, remains anxious of a more robust Indo-US strategic partnership that could redound to its disadvantage.
Whether or not India can forge such a relationship with the United States remains uncertain despite Modi’s enthusiastic reception in multiple US quarters. The US and India remain at odds on a host of global, regional and bilateral issues. At a global level, India’s stance on food subsidies, blocking the WTO’s last-ditch effort to revive the Doha round, has placed it at loggerheads with the United States. India seems unwilling to take on any substantial role in addressing questions of climate change and carbon emissions, and it has looked askance at the US willingness to rely on the principle of the “responsibility to protect” to intervene in various parts of the world, notably Libya.
Closer to home, New Delhi remains concerned about the impending US drawdown in Afghanistan and Washington’s unwillingness to confront Pakistan on its continuing dalliance with the purveyors of terror. And though US-Iranian relations have thawed ever so slightly, India was long unwilling to isolate Iran. In bilateral terms, a number of differences persist. US firms find it difficult to invest in India, the question of retroactive taxation continues to dog them and the draconian Indian nuclear liability bill has deterred American investors in the Indian civilian nuclear industry. In their joint editorial, Modi and Obama pledged “efforts to bring American-origin nuclear power technologies to India.”
India too has its own litany of complaints. Apart from the contretemps last year involving diplomat Devyani Khobragade, which helped stoke latent anti-American sentiments, India has long complained about its own lack of market access to the US. Specifically, New Delhi has sought greater numbers of H1-B visas for skilled Indian professionals to work in the United States; although Indian workers received about two thirds of the visas in 2012, an annual cap keeps their number small. In other areas, New Delhi remains uneasy with American stipulations about possible arms sales to India, which it deems to hamper its efforts to secure vital military acquisitions. Managing domestic aspirations and the country’s long-held attitude towards foreign engagement would have a decisive impact on US-India relations.
Modi has been warmly welcomed in the United States. However, it’s far from clear if he and his principal foreign and security policy advisers can jettison what might be referred to as the shadow of the past. His visit could contribute to a new chapter in Indo-US relations. During the Cold War, despite much talk about shared democratic values and institutions, India and the United States pursued divergent goals and were close to each other’s adversaries.
The two nations are now at a wholly different historical juncture. The Modi-Obama joint vision statement is a good start, but long after the ink has dried on their editorial Modi and his team must forge a viable policy agenda and follow through on a set of initiatives with domestic consensus on the content of Indo-US strategic partnership. Then, the two states may indeed enter a new era of cooperation. Such a partnership would involve an avoidance of mutual recriminations, close and routinized consultations, and a working policy agenda that addresses concerns of both sides. A focus on extant and unresolved bilateral issues, a discussion of shared regional security concerns and plans for tackling compelling global issues might constitute a useful start. Modi, after his triumphal visit to the United States and with a secure parliamentary majority at home, should be in a position to address these concerns.
Tackling them with his seemingly endless zeal might actually enable him to realize the two critical goals that he dwelled on during his electoral campaign: to bring shared economic prosperity and guarantee India’s national security.
Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science, holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington, and is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.


MODI’S US VISIT AND INDIAN NUCLEAR CONUNDRUM, By Kaveri Ashok

MODI’S US VISIT AND INDIAN NUCLEAR CONUNDRUM, By Kaveri Ashok
The eagerly awaited Modi-Obama summit, scheduled for September 29-30, is expected to “set an ambitious new agenda to chart a new course in the relationship” between the two countries. Considering the six years long stalemate owing to India’s Civil Nuclear Damage Liability bill, the Indo-US nuclear deal will indeed be a key topic of discussion. The historic deal which was essentially the ice-breaker of India’s nuclear isolation of almost thirty years has been in many ways compensatory to its NPT non-signatory status. An agenda to move forward the long-stalled deal is bound to gain momentum presently as India endeavours for civil nuclear deals with Japan and Australia and its NSG membership.
India, with its ambitious nuclear energy plans, is definitely an attractive market for the suppliers around the globe. All the suppliers interested in the Indian market, namely the US, France and Russia, have however unequivocally objected to the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage bill of 2010, specifically clause 17(b) and section 46. These deal with the right of recourse for the operator against the supplier and right to file tort claims for the victims respectively. The US has been the most disconcerted with this because the suppliers and contractors of the US are privately owned unlike their European state-owned counter-parts. The US government, in the interests of its major private suppliers collective, had pressurised the Indian government to be party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damages (CSC), the most significant international instrument for model liability regime.
The concept of exclusive liability, or channelling of liability (to the operator), which is the corner stone of all the international instruments of nuclear liability, has been followed since the first convention on this issue — Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963. E Ameye, member of the European Commission Expert Group on Nuclear Liability, argues that the nuclear industry is no longer an infant industry and that the possible role of the players other than the operator such as the suppliers, designers, transporters etc should be taken into account, considering the highly complex and evolved reactor technologies of today. The Indian legislation’s additional right of recourse and the right to file tort claims hence can be seen as a firm footing for a necessary paradigm shift from the traditional liability models.
The CSC (1997) is the latest among the three international conventions instrumental for the liability regime. The acceding countries are obliged to model their domestic liability legislation on its draft law. The annexe draft law specifies the right of recourse for the operator only a) if this is expressly provided for by a contract in writing, or b) if the damage results from an act or omission of someone with intent to cause damage. The clause 17(b) of the Indian liability act gives an additional ground for right of recourse for the operator against the suppliers: ‘if the damage is caused by a wilful act or gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material, equipment or services or of his employee.’ The section 46 of the Indian Act states that the liability bill will not affect the other laws in force, thus implying that in case of an accident, criminal liability as well as tort claims remain valid. The CSC cannot in any way interfere in the normal operation of the regular legal mechanisms of the country. Thus it can be argued that the two tweaks from the model draft law, technically do not violate the terms of CSC; only explicitly states its implications. The US had however contended that India’s liability law is not in conformity with the CSC. In response, rightly so, India had contended that the only requirement for signing the CSC was that the concerned “State declares that its national law complies with the provisions of the Annex to this Convention.” Although India has signed the CSC on 27th October 2010, the ratification is yet to happen.
The Liability Act faces equally strong critiques in the domestic front as well, mainly on account of the liability cap on the operator. The total liability amount would be capped at a maximum amount of 300 million SDR (Special Drawing Rights), regardless of the extent of the damages caused in case of an incident. This amount is also inadequate to draw funding from the international pool created as part of the CSC as it can be accessed only if the liability due to nuclear damage exceeds 300 million SDR. Moreover, most of the major nuclear power generating countries do not have a cap on the liability. On the flip side, the domestic suppliers too are unwilling to supply the components for nuclear power plants. This will definitely spark a crisis in the Indian nuclear industry, which has managed even without the foreign suppliers when under sanctions, with extensive reliance on its domestic companies.
While addressing the liability conundrum, it needs be acknowledged that an effective liability regime is an important agent for assuring safety and containing any neglect by the key players involved. In a sense, its role is more significant than that of independent regulation. The risks of a nuclear establishment by nature are dynamic and complicated. This demands more flexibility for the operators, rather than step-by-step regulations enforced by an independent authority. With an effective liability rule, the operators can improvise and modify according to the risk he generates.
Finally, the question remains as to how the new government will choose to address this issue, balancing both the supplier and the domestic concerns. Dilution of the Liability Act is not an option, which is an important lesson learnt globally, even as Japan, Asia’s richest democracy, is dragging its feet with the decontamination activities and compensation to the victims, three years and counting post-Fukushima.
It may be safely assumed that the nuclear suppliers will not keep away from the lucrative Indian market, considering the extensive nuclear plan it is determined to embark upon. It is probable that the suppliers may increase their prices to an unreasonable level in the name of high insurance premiums. However, this will eventually be a backlash for the suppliers because of the possible market crash due to high costs of nuclear energy compared to the alternatives. Given the situation, the most desirable solution would be for the suppliers to accept the Indian Liability Act as an incentive to ensure the maximum possible safety and security of the materials and services, instead of dealing with it as an impediment.
As a first step towards nuclear diplomacy, the Modi Government’s ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocol is indeed a wise one. Whether the “Modi lexicon” would charm the long-flustered US suppliers, is a pivotal question for the Indian nuclear programme.
(The writer is a Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)


Deforestation, Timber Mafia and Corruption in Diamer, by Liaqat Karim

Deforestation, Timber Mafia and Corruption in Diamer, by Liaqat Karim
Have you ever had a by-road trip to Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)? If yes, I am sure you have seen the several cubic feet timber, laid on the sides of KKH in Diamer district. Every day tons of wood is smuggled to various parts of Pakistan from GB and new trees are cut to replace the smuggled wood In July 2014, I visited GB and saw dozens of trucks laden with timber coming towards south on KKH. Nobody knows who permitted this havoc. After the lifting of ban on cutting of trees in GB by Raja Pervez Ashraf, on March 15, 2013, more than 500 old trees were cut and several thousand cubic meter of wood was sold. The lifting of ban was reversed later, however the damage had been done.
Poverty of natives and corruption in the relevant institution has exacerbated the issue. People who have the authority to issue the permits have become millionaires by signing permits and allowing the massacre of the local flora. The ruthless deforestation in the area has caused a lot of issues on local as well as national level.  The Flash floods have become more frequent causing loss of lives and property locally as well as nationally. GB government in collaboration with the natives shall take immediate steps to stop further deforestation. The culprits shall be held accountable who have misused their authorities either to decorate their lavish houses using this timber or to sign the permits for making money.
According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Pakistan lost33.2 percent of its forest cover between 1990 and 2010. Most of this deforestation was done in northern parts of Pakistan, including Diamer district of GB. Although, the issue was aggravated after the lifting of ban on transport of wood to other parts by Pakistan People Party (PPP) government in 2013, however, the corrupt leaders and government officials have been experts for finding loopholes to allow deforestation in the area. Instead of protecting these resources the government official in departments like department of forest, have been involved in promoting deforestation by issuing illicit permits for the transport of wood.

The impacts of denuding of these forests include soil erosion which is causing siltation in Tarbela dam, flash floods causing loss of lives and property, increase in flood water causing destruction in the Indus plain downstream and much more. Recent floods claimed more than 250 lives across Pakistan. These floods killed more than 8 people and damaged more than dozen houses in Diamer district, alone. Furthermore, the deforestation is casing loss of biodiversity in the area at an alarming rate. The endemic wild animals are either killed by the hunters or are forced to evacuate by destroying their natural habitat. Any increase in precipitation due to construction of dams in future may trigger serious landslides from the barren mountains of GB. Moreover, this deforestation may also alter the climate of the region causing extreme weather patterns in the area
Due to the good quality of wood, the demand of wood from this area always remains on the peak making it an easy way to make money. According to the people involved in this viscous business, the price of wood from the chopped trees is Rs200 per foot in GB, whereas it makes more than Rs4000 per foot in larger cities. It is obvious that, the natives are not getting enough, yet the native are the first victims of incidents like flash floods and environmental degradation. The locals should understand this issue and should play their role to stop this catastrophic activity in the region.
The limited resources of the natives, their dependency on the timber mafia and the corrupt system has played a malicious role in the massacre of these trees. Generally, government of Pakistan and specifically, government of GB should take serious steps to overcome these issues in the area.  Natives shall be provided with other means of earning to stop their involvement in such activities, rather they shall be used to conserve the forests by proving incentives. Moreover, the mafia and the corrupt officers involved in the smuggling of timber should be brought to justice. Especially, the government officers who misused their power shall be identified through a judicial crackdown and serious action shall be taken against them. Unlike the past, a debate in the national assembly shall be made mandatory to lift any ban or to change any policy regarding the transport of wood from this part of the country. A single guy, who most probably may be a corrupt individual, should not decide the fate of the fragile environment of this area. The money earned from the cut trees shall be strictly used for afforestation in the area.
It is in the best interest of the natives and the people living downstream of GB to stop deforestation and encourage afforestation in the area. In order to avoid frequent landslides, flash floods, extreme weather patterns, and loss of biodiversity, we should raise our voice against the timber mafia of GB. Let us speak against deforestation in Diamer at every available forum and force the authorities to take serious steps to ensure security of the remaining trees on the mountains of GB.