MODI - FORGING NEW
RELATIONSHIPS WITH WASHINGTON
By Sumit Ganguly
It was perhaps fitting that India’s newly elected prime minister
would be asked to define his approach to global and strategic issues during his
maiden appearance at the United Nations and, later, during his first meeting
with US President Barack Obama. Following that meeting, the two men drafted a joint statement in the form of an op-ed. The agenda
for cooperation that they have spelled out is hardly modest: It seeks to
address issues ranging from countering climate change to terrorism. Until now,
Modi’s focus has been on domestic issues and regional problems. India’s global
role and strategic ambitions ultimately depend on his ability to deliver at
home.
During his election campaign, he infrequently raised foreign
policy issues. These were mostly confined to regional security and ongoing
issues involving India’s neighbors, Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China
and Pakistan. On Bangladesh, he highlighted illegal immigration; on the PRC he
decried the country’s “expansionist attitude”; and on Pakistan he raised the
familiar matter of its support for terror. Beyond these concerns, he offered a
speech extolling Japan’s economic success and the need to attract Japanese
investment to India.
The bulk of his campaign
rhetoric instead focused on placing India on a path to economic growth and
prosperity. Fulfilling that promise requires a robust foreign policy.
Since assuming office in
May, Modi has visited Japan, hosted China’s President Xi Jinping in New Delhi
and just wrapped up a visit to the United States. The visit to Japan, though
mostly successful and conducted with much fanfare, failed to yield a crucial
nuclear agreement. Such talks began three years ago, but were suspended after
the 2011 Fukushima disaster. India hopes to access Japanese technology for
nuclear power, but reservations run deep in Japan over non-proliferation and
nuclear safety.
Xi’s visit proved to be
far more fraught. Even as his Chinese interlocutor was in the country, the
People’s Liberation Army once again chose to make a series of incursions along
a disputed section of the Sino-Indian border in Ladakh. PRC apologists were
inclined to dismiss the incursions as the result of bureaucratic wrangling
within China – a convenient but unrealistic argument. On its own, the PLA would
not dare embarrass the leader of the Communist Party. Accordingly, it is
reasonable to surmise that the PLA’s actions in Ladakh had enjoyed the
president’s imprimatur.
The episode was hardly
an isolated incident. For the past several years, the PLA had routinely
conducted limited probes along the disputed border. The timing of this
particular occurrence was simply more infelicitous. Indeed, despite Xi’s offer
to invest upwards of $20 billion in India over the next several years, the
relationship remains troubled. The border dispute, despite endless diplomatic
palaver, is no closer to a resolution. Sino-Indian trade, though approaching
$60 billion is imbalanced. Not only is it in the PRC’s favor, but India mostly
exports raw materials to the country while importing a range of consumer and
industrial goods.
Beyond these features of
the bilateral relationship, the two sides are wary of each other’s presence in
Southeast Asia, with differing positions on the maritime disputes in the South
China Sea and carefully watching the other’s involvement in India’s immediate
neighborhood. Furthermore, both sides view their ties to the United States as a
critical issue in their own bilateral relations. India frets about a possible
Sino-American condominium along the lines that Zbigniew Brzezinski had once
suggested, which briefly enjoyed favor among some policymaking circles in the first
Obama administration. The PRC, in turn, remains anxious of a more robust
Indo-US strategic partnership that could redound to its disadvantage.
Whether or not India can
forge such a relationship with the United States remains uncertain despite
Modi’s enthusiastic reception in multiple US quarters. The US and India remain
at odds on a host of global, regional and bilateral issues. At a global level,
India’s stance on food subsidies, blocking the WTO’s last-ditch effort to
revive the Doha round, has placed it at loggerheads with the United States.
India seems unwilling to take on any substantial role in addressing questions
of climate change and carbon emissions, and it has looked askance at the US
willingness to rely on the principle of the “responsibility to protect” to
intervene in various parts of the world, notably Libya.
Closer to home, New
Delhi remains concerned about the impending US drawdown in Afghanistan and
Washington’s unwillingness to confront Pakistan on its continuing dalliance
with the purveyors of terror. And though US-Iranian relations have thawed ever
so slightly, India was long unwilling to isolate Iran. In bilateral terms, a
number of differences persist. US firms find it difficult to invest in India,
the question of retroactive taxation continues to dog them and the draconian
Indian nuclear liability bill has deterred American investors in the Indian
civilian nuclear industry. In their joint editorial, Modi and Obama pledged
“efforts to bring American-origin nuclear power technologies to India.”
India too has its own
litany of complaints. Apart from the contretemps last year involving diplomat
Devyani Khobragade, which helped stoke latent anti-American sentiments, India
has long complained about its own lack of market access to the US. Specifically,
New Delhi has sought greater numbers of H1-B visas for skilled Indian
professionals to work in the United States; although Indian workers received
about two thirds of the visas in 2012, an annual cap keeps their number small.
In other areas, New Delhi remains uneasy with American stipulations about
possible arms sales to India, which it deems to hamper its efforts to secure
vital military acquisitions. Managing domestic aspirations and the country’s
long-held attitude towards foreign engagement would have a decisive impact on
US-India relations.
Modi has been warmly
welcomed in the United States. However, it’s far from clear if he and his
principal foreign and security policy advisers can jettison what might be
referred to as the shadow of the past. His visit could contribute to a new
chapter in Indo-US relations. During the Cold War, despite much talk about
shared democratic values and institutions, India and the United States pursued
divergent goals and were close to each other’s adversaries.
The two nations are now
at a wholly different historical juncture. The Modi-Obama joint vision
statement is a good start, but long after the ink has dried on their editorial
Modi and his team must forge a viable policy agenda and follow through on a set
of initiatives with domestic consensus on the content of Indo-US strategic
partnership. Then, the two states may indeed enter a new era of cooperation.
Such a partnership would involve an avoidance of mutual recriminations, close
and routinized consultations, and a working policy agenda that addresses
concerns of both sides. A focus on extant and unresolved bilateral issues, a
discussion of shared regional security concerns and plans for tackling
compelling global issues might constitute a useful start. Modi, after his
triumphal visit to the United States and with a secure parliamentary majority
at home, should be in a position to address these concerns.
Tackling them with his
seemingly endless zeal might actually enable him to realize the two critical
goals that he dwelled on during his electoral campaign: to bring shared
economic prosperity and guarantee India’s national security.
Sumit
Ganguly is
a professor of political science, holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian
Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington, and is a senior
fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.
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