The weak state of Pakistan, William Milam
Political theory
scholars continue to argue over the concept of strong and weak states, not only
how each got that way, but also whether the condition, no matter how it is
defined, is immutable or improvable. This has become especially relevant in the
past few decades in the larger context of state failure giving impetus to
regional instability and spawning extremism, as well as in the decided
retrogression of democratization around the world.
The characteristics
of strong and weak states are not so much in dispute as the determinants. The
main criteria for a strong state are control over its entire territory.
Secondary benchmarks such as the ability to protect its citizens, to provide
law and order, justice, and other public goods are also important.
But as to
determinants, scholars are all over the place. Some still believe that
geography is destiny, that for example that mountainous terrain is not fertile
ground for strong states, while flat terrain is because it supports sedentary
agriculture. Afghanistan, they say, cannot build a strong state. But what about
flat and fertile Bangladesh which aspires to be a strong state but flunks
almost every test of governance. And what about Peru where the Incas built a
strong state in very mountainous terrain and with that state about 40,000 km of
roads. (Maybe it was the roads that made the state strong.)
Pakistan has used geography to weaken the state
The explanations
that make more sense focus on social and cultural factors, and especially on
how the institutions of the state are created and evolve over time. I am
tempted to point out that Pakistan has used geography to weaken the state, not
strengthen it, by relying for many years on its geostrategic significance to
avoid political and economic reform.
The debate goes
back to the 17th century, to the cleavage between Thomas
Hobbes, who conceived of a “social contract” that gave rulers absolute power to
govern—the Leviathan, Hobbes called it—and those who followed John Locke and
spoke for a social contract that limited government, giving rights that would
be considered “inalienable” to the people. Hobbes felt that only the strong
would survive without an absolute power imposing order and his social contract
traded individual liberty for safety and order. Locke argued, essentially, that
some rights are universal and governments’ job is to protect those rights.
Some scholars have
found evidence of societies in which the disadvantaged run from strong states,
opting out of the society for fear that an authoritarian strong state will be
the instrument of repression and extraction by its elites. But others have also
found that some disadvantaged segments of society see a strong, sometimes
authoritarian state, as a bulwark against their own rapacious elites. And some
recent research has posited the idea of a “consensually strong” state, one
which is strong because its citizens insist it be so to provide the public
goods they desire. They have the power to turn out the government if these good
are not forthcoming. This seems to be the case in Scandinavia, where the states
are politically weak, under direct control of their citizens. So unlike the
authoritarian states which cannot be controlled by their citizens, and thus
provide public goods of their own choosing, sometimes aimed at increasing the economic
rents that its elites rake off, these consensually strong states are controlled
by their citizens and must give the public what it demands.
Pakistan could be poised to choose the Lockian path
of limited government and assured rights
It is not clear where
all this leaves us with regard to Pakistan. I suspect that all political theory
scholars would agree that is that Pakistan is a flagrant example of a weak
state. It appears to be among those who are overtly weak— those for which the
answer to core question of state strength—whether it controls its own
territory, or to put it another way, whether it maintains a monopoly on the use
of violence throughout its territory, the bedrock definition of a strong
state—is clearly a ringing “no.” This is indisputable given a 40-year
insurgency in Baluchistan, the decade-long war against the Pakistan Taliban, as
well the existence of a plethora of armed militant groups throughout the
country with agendas that are in stark contrast to the government’s agenda and
which, in many cases, seem to operate openly and often with an apparent measure
of impunity. In addition, Pakistan falls far short in many of the other
measures of state strength. These include most of the areas of governance—law
and order, justice, health services, education, social advancement of women,
and the provision of many other public goods.
But whether this is
a clear and certain signal of the inevitable failure of the state over some
timeline we can see only dimly is not sure. Yes, all the signs look dismal at
present. It will take a sweeping transformation of the society and the polity
to reverse the course. One could call it a revolution, but the trouble with
revolutions is that the guys with the guns usually win, and in Pakistan’s case
that is either the army or the extremists.
Two very small
glimmers of light that flicker in the tunnel ahead interest me, however, though
they are too weak to cast any glow of optimism. First, many Pakistanis now seem
to realize that hiding from necessary reform behind “geographic significance”
is not just counterproductive, it is downright pernicious. The question is:
will the public demand that the politicians recognize this. If the public does
not, then the politicians will not. And Pakistan’s friends, whose core interest
must be helping to build a strong but democratic state, may be awakening to
that thought also. A reformed Pakistan that lives within its means would be a
welcome turnaround.
Second, unlike
Bangladesh, its former other half, which appears to have chosen the Hobbesian
authoritarian path to strength (and is unlikely to achieve it), Pakistan could
be poised to choose the Lockian path of limited government and assured rights.
The recent hijinks in the streets of Islamabad show democratic feeling still
strong, both in regard to the undemocratic way the marchers wanted to change
the government, but also in the lack of support for military involvement. I
note also that a small core of very brave Pakistanis continue to push for the
extension of, codification of, and enforcement of universal human rights. This
is a very small and weak seed, but with careful nurturing could produce a green
shoot of two. Pakistan’s foreign friends should perhaps take notice and find
ways to keep the seed alive.
The author is a
former US diplomat who was Ambassador to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Chief of
Mission in Liberia
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