Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces
By Anthony H.
Cordesman, Sam Khazai JUN 12, 2014
The crisis in Iraq threatens to destabilize the
entire country and extend far beyond Iraq’s borders. Militants from the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have taken control of cities, government offices
and foreign consulates, ransacked banks, and released prisoners as they seize
Mosul and Tikrit in their drive towards Baghdad. Iraq’s troubles stem not only
from the resurgence of Al Qaeda and ISIS militants, but also from the threat of
internal corruption, failures in governance, political repression, and
inability to incorporate the country’s sizable Sunni and Kurdish communities
into a national alliance.
As the Burke Chair in Strategy’s Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces report makes
clear, “Iraq lacked the internal incentives – and checks and balances –
necessary to make them function once US advisors were gone”. As the report
points out “successful force building takes far longer than the US military was
generally willing to admit,” and “a command culture that supported initiative
and decision-making at junior levels…could not survive the departure of US
advisors and loss of US influence”.
No one within the region can defend against the
kind of violent Islamic extremism that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) represents, and the threat it poses to Iraq, Syria, and the wider region
is incredibly destabilizing. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Maliki poses an
equally destabilizing threat of a different kind. He cannot govern, and he
represses and divides. In fact, he threatens to become another Saddam Hussein,
albeit one without the same "charm" and effectiveness.
The key problem, however, is that Maliki has
corrupted and undermined the army, police, and justice system in his
consolidation of power and personal advantage. For years, Maliki has
intimidated and driven key Sunni figures out of his government, ignored
agreements to create a national unity government, alienated the Kurds, and
tried to repress legitimate Sunni opposition in ways that have contributed to
steadily rising violence and civilian deaths. These failures in governance by
Prime Minister Maliki’s government date back to 2010-2011, long before ISIS
captured Fallujah and Ramadi in December 2013, and seized control of Mosul and
Tikrit in June of 2014.
He used the Army and police in ways that alienated
Sunnis in Iraq's West and North, used them to attack peaceful protests, and
failed to keep his promises to offer jobs and promotions to the Sons of Iraq.
He also has corrupted the security forces, using promotions and interim
appointments for his own political advantage, and let the army and police
steadily deteriorate. Pay and support had riding problems, positions and
promotions were for sale, desertions increased and there were more and more
ghost soldiers -- men listed as present but not actually there.
Weak police forces started to hide in their
stations after the army failed to suppress peaceful Sunni protest camps in the
West. ISIS then exploited this situation, poorly organized heavy weapons
attacks failed, and the army showed it could not conduct urban warfare
effectively or deal with irregular attacks on its troops. The army did hold
together in a mixed Sunni-Shi’ite area like Samarra but imploded in hostile
Sunni Areas like Mosul and Tikrit.
The United States now faces a major dilemma. It
must try, yet again, to deal with Maliki in spite of his conduct and broken
promises to the United States and Sunni tribal leaders since ISIS invaded in
December. It must deal with the possibility that Iran intervenes on Maliki's
behalf, or that ISIS becomes a far more existential and enduring threat. The
fact remains, however, that Maliki is an incompetent authoritarian thug. U.S.
aid must be carefully rationed and made conditional. The United States must
press for efforts to bring the Sunnis and Kurds into a true national
government, it must deny aid where new human rights abuses occur, and quietly
send the message that it would scarcely object if a new Shi’ite leader emerged
who would make such a government a reality and put the nation above himself.
ISIS is now fighting on two fronts. It is making
major gains in northern and western Iraq, and simultaneously trying to take
over a far larger portion of the rebel held areas in Syria. Its stated goal is
to create a broader Islamic Caliphate. However, it currently faces serious
challenges in Syria from the Al Nusra front and other rebel forces, and it has
not shown it can make serious gains against Assad's Iranian backed allies –
Hezbollah.
It is also far from clear that Syrian urban and
moderate Sunnis would ever accept ISIS’s rule, much less the region’s Alewites,
or that Iran and Hezbollah would not further reinforce Assad if ISIS really
threatened to take Syria's major population centers. Moreover, ISIS can never
get US or European support, or official support from key Gulf states like Saudi
Arabia, the UAE or Kuwait.
ISIS will also face growing challenges the moment
it moves on Baghdad and Iraq's Shiite south or against the Kurds. It would
threaten a key oil exporter, directly challenge Iran, and challenge the key
Southern Gulf states, possibly uniting states that otherwise are de facto enemies.
Oil is simply too important to let ISIS seize all of Iraq, although any kind of
unified front or rapid effective resistance to this level of ISIS gains does
not seem likely at this point.
What could be far more difficult, however, is
preventing ISIS from creating at least a temporary enclave in western and
northern Iraq and some parts of eastern and northeastern Syria. Part of Syria
is already a power vacuum that Assad seems willing to let fester and contain,
at least until he can control all of Syria's major cities and central Syria.
The US-trained Iraqi Security Forces lost unity,
morale, leadership, and effectiveness. Good officers left or were pushed out or
sidelined. Unit cohesion dropped steadily, service support became a major
problem, desertions and ghost soldiers increased, and sectarian tension grew.
The police deteriorated steadily and mixed corruption and abuses with a
tendency to retreat to their stations whenever serious resistance occurred.
Maliki became his own worst enemy, ignoring warnings
from US advisors, dealing with Iran, and steadily losing confidence from Arab
states while alienating the Iraqi Kurds. His force could not deal with urban
warfare, tried to shell or bomb their way to victory, deserted under pressure,
and found themselves under constant threat from low level ISIS and Sunni tribal
attacks. Some Iraqi forces still fought, as was the case in Samara, but much of
the West and North turned against Maliki in spite of the abuses and extremism
of ISIS.
This explains the collapse of the Iraqi force
around Mosul, mass desertions and abandoned equipment and the other advances
taking place, which now include Iraq's largest refinery. It also raises serious
questions about whether Iraq can move forward as long as Maliki remains its leader.
He may still be able to bribe some key Sunni tribal leaders, and ISIS may soon
alienate many Sunnis in the areas it occupies, but Maliki has emerged as
something approaching the Shiite equivalent of Saddam Hussein, and is as much a
threat to Iraq as ISIS.
Iraq desperately needs a truly national leader and
one who puts the nation above himself. Without one, ISIS may become a lasting
enclave and regional threat -- dividing Iraq into Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish
sections -- or drag Iraq back to the worst days of its civil war and create
another Syria-type conflict in the region.
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