– JUNE 10, 2014
Mention Narendra Modi‘s
name to Chinese officials in Beijing and an enthusiastic smile is the likely
response. China’s government sees something of its own in India’s new Prime
Minister, a strong, decisive leader who emphasises development, is keen to
learn from China’s economic success and will never be beholden to the United
States. “Modi to boost ties with China,” proclaimed the state-run China Daily
newspaper in a front-page story on May 27, while an editorial enthused about
the prospects of the two countries forging a more constructive relationship
based on their “common aspiration for prosperity”.
On his last visit
to China in 2011, Modi was treated almost as well as a head of state, accorded
the rare privilege of a reception in the Great Hall of the People, and meetings
with four members of the ruling Politburo. But Modi granted his hosts an equal
show of respect, China Daily eagerly recalled, presenting business cards “with
one side in Chinese and in red-the color that symbolises wealth and good
fortune in China”.
India under Modi,
just like Gujarat under Modi, will seek out and enable Chinese investment, the
government here hopes and believes, and in a style it can relate to.
At a time when
China’s biggest investments in Myanmar are bogged down by public protests and
accusations of human rights abuses, Modi presents a very different kind of
partner for the elite in Beijing: A man who bulldozes the opposition and simply
gets things done-whether by fair means, as his supporters would say, or by
foul, as his critics argue.
Nor is it lost on
China that Modi was a frequent visitor here at a time when the United States
had denied him a visa. While the West was blocking and antagonising Modi,
“China didn’t draw a line based on ideology,” wrote South Asian expert Qian
Feng in an op-ed in the nationalist Global Times newspaper. The two attitudes
“formed a strong contrast”, he said, arguing that it will be inevitably tougher
for the West to woo India and constrain China.
China’s government,
though, is too wise to expect Modi to fall into its lap. It knows that, for the
same economic reasons underpinning his wooing of China, Modi is likely to seek
closer ties with the United States than his predecessor’s government left
behind, in the ruins of the Devyani Khobragade affair. Already, voices in
Washington are urging the Obama administration to grasp the opportunity for a
fresh start with the new Indian Government, and with Modi in particular.
Modi visited Japan
in 2007 and 2012, successfully attracted Japanese investment to Gujarat, and is
likely to boost defence and security ties with the East Asian nation, China’s
biggest rival. He also appears to have formed a close bond with another
assertive nationalist, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is deeply
disliked and distrusted in Beijing. Modi, Beijing will be aware, is one of only
three people Abe follows on Twitter, and the Chinese government will be
watching this relationship as closely as any.
Nor are experts
here expecting Modi to magically resolve China’s long-running border dispute
with India: For one thing, China is unlikely to be in the mood to make any
territorial concessions with India while it simultaneously promotes a
maximalist position in its maritime claims in the South China and East China
seas. Modi’s campaign warning to China, that it must abandon its “expansionist
mindset”, did ring a few alarm bells in Beijing, but is largely seen as simply
an example of campaign rhetoric from a man ever keen to burnish his nationalist
credentials.
While one analyst
here hit the headlines by comparing Modi to Richard Nixon, the US Republican
president who famously forged closer ties with Mao’s China, the more thoughtful
comparison is with Atal Bihari Vajpayee, under whom New Delhi’s relations with
Beijing improved and trade expanded. The Bharatiya Janata Party is seen in
China as having “less historical baggage” than the Congress, for whom memories
of the 1962 border war are perhaps more personal and painfully humiliating.
China’s government
has never come to terms with India’s raucous media, and tended to blame the
Indian government when it came in for vituperative criticism from India’s more
nationalistic television channels and newspapers over its alleged border
incursions.
Used to a state
that maintains an iron grip over the media, Beijing could not help but suspect
that the hand of Ministry of External Affairs was directing the outrage over
one incident or another, or at least could have done more to restrain emotions.
The reality, of course, may simply have been that television anchors were
merely filling the vacuum created by an uncommunicative and unresponsive UPA
government, which had failed to set the agenda.
The government
of Manmohan Singh is
described by experts here as “indecisive” and “overcautious”, and while Modi is
seen as “ambitious” and “aggressive”, that is not necessarily a criticism.
China will at least be looking forward to dealing with someone who is very much
his own man.
From now on, Beijing
can reasonably expect, India’s foreign policy will at least take its cue from
Narendra Modi, and not from TV news anchor Arnab Goswami.
Simon Denyer is
author of Rogue Elephant: Harnessing the Power of India’s Unruly Democracy. He
is currently The Washington Post’s China bureau chief in Beijing.
By Simon Denyer
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