The Karachi
Attacks and Pakistan's Uncertain Future, By Daniele Grassi
The government is unprepared to comprehensively deal with even a
fractured TTP in the short-term.
An attack carried out by
commandos of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
at Jinnah International Airport in Karachi (capital of the province of Sind),
overnight between June 8 and 9, casts many shadows on the future of the
country.
Armed with suicide
vests, grenades and rocket launchers, TTP militants engaged security forces in clashes that lasted more than 5 hours,
resulting in the temporary closure of the airport, as well as in a death toll of 36 victims (including 10 attackers).
The attack, one of the
most serious and complex carried out in recent months, comes in the wake of an
attempt by the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to negotiate an
agreement with the TTP, as well as a few days after a schism within the group. On
May 28, the faction led by Said Khan (also known as Sajna), based mainly in
South Waziristan and comprising largely members of the Mehsud tribe (which has
until now represented the hard core of the TTP), announced their split, due to
differences with the current leadership of the group (with Mullah Fazlullah at
the apex).
The attack on the
Karachi International Airport, the main airport of the country, provides some
important indication of the current status of the TTP and the government’s
security apparatus.
First, it showcased the
persistent ability of the TTP to strike high-profile targets. Despite the
recent split, the group can still count on important human and military
resources, and now seems willing to raise the level of fighting in an attempt
to dissuade the government from any military action. In recent days, many
assumed a military campaign in the agency of North Waziristan and neighbouring
areas would occur, where the group’s main bases reside. This hypothesis remains
plausible, but the attack in Karachi, and those previously carried out in
Islamabad and Rawalpindi, demonstrate that a military intervention could
unleash a series of attacks throughout the country, including in areas that
were hitherto largely untouched by the wave of terrorism. In recent months,
Pakistani intelligence has shed light on the TTP’s attempt to strengthen its
ties with religious institutions in the capital, hoping to be able to count on
more resources in the event of an extended campaign of attacks.
Second, the attack in
Karachi highlights serious gaps in the Pakistani security apparatus. During
such a fluid and delicate period, the risk of an attack on a high-profile
target was evident. Although the Pakistani security forces managed to limit the
terrorist’s impact (whose goal was to destroy all aircraft present at the
airport of Karachi), the inability to prevent it is a serious defeat for them,
and the state as a whole.
Finally, the attack on
the airport seems to definitively remove the possibility of an agreement between
the government and the TTP (an official decision in this regard will be
announced at the end of a Cabinet Committee on National Security summit,
scheduled for this week), thus hindering a planned effort to focus on the
economy.
In recent months,
Pakistan has experienced a small economic boom, with a significant increase in stock
market indices, a gradual strengthening of the rupee against major
international currencies, and a significant increase in foreign exchange
reserves (thanks to loans from the IMF and World Bank). Nevertheless, the overall
economic situation is not encouraging, as the country remains unable to attract
a more substantial flow of foreign investment (which was approximately $1.4
billion last year). The attack in Karachi in this respect is a serious blow to
the government’s plans, showcasing the precarious security environment.
However, even if in the
short term there is instability, characterized by an increased terrorist threat
in the country’s main cities, the recent TTP split could offer the government
some interesting opportunities, allowing it to step up its action against one
of Pakistan’s most effective terrorist groups. For this to be possible,
however, the government and armed forces will need to overcome their current
differences and establish a clear line of action, supported by an effective
communication campaign, which could likely win the favor of the population and
counter the propaganda of the numerous political groups, and those who
sympathize with the jihadist movement.
However, it seems
unlikely that there is a general reconsideration of the relationship between
some sectors of the state apparatus (particularly intelligence), and various
terrorist groups that have bases in Pakistan, but mainly operate outside the
country (especially in Indian Kashmir and Afghanistan). Although in recent
years there has been significant progress on this point, the state-terrorist
relationship seems too close to be ended in a short period. In fact, it would
require a general rethinking of the current foreign policy paradigm, and a
broader reconfiguration of the existing balance of power within the country; an
effort that Pakistan does not seem to be able to make for the time being.
Daniele Grassi is a security advisor for a private company
based in Rome.
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