India’s Nuclear Doctrine -
Time For A Review? – By Gurmeet Kanwal*
The fragile security environment in Southern Asia
is marked by territorial disputes and radical extremism, among other threats
and challenges to peace and stability. The security environment has been
further vitiated by the proxy war being waged against India (and against
Afghanistan) by the Pakistan army and the ISI – the ‘deep state’ – through
terrorist organisations like the LeT and the JeM.
While the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks at
Mumbai in November 2008 are still to be brought to justice by the authorities
in Pakistan, recent terrorist attacks in India have occurred at Gurdaspur,
Udhampur, Pathankot, Pampore and Uri. India’s patience had worn thin and the
public outcry to punish Pakistan was growing by the day when the Indian army
launched surgical strikes across the LoC in September 2016.
In case there is a major terrorist strike in India
(on a politically sensitive target, with damage to critical infrastructure and
large-scale casualties) with credible evidence of state sponsorship from Pakistan,
the Indian government will have no option but to retaliate militarily. Though
the Indian response will be carefully calibrated, any military retaliation runs
the risk of escalation to a larger conflict with nuclear overtones.
Most Indian analysts believe that there is space
for conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold as long as care is taken
to avoid crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines (space, military, economic and
political). Pakistani analysts aver that Pakistan has a low nuclear threshold
and that Indian forces ingressing into Pakistani territory will be confronted
with tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) to stop their advance and force them to
retreat.
It must be noted that the term ‘TNW’ is used in a
colloquial sense as it is widely in use. There is no such thing as the
‘tactical’ use of nuclear weapons; their impact is strategic and their
consequences are likely to be geo-strategic. Perhaps the term ‘battlefield’ use
of nuclear weapons would be preferable.
Pakistan has been developing what it calls ‘full
spectrum deterrence’ from the strategic to the tactical, from IRBMs (Shaheen 1,
2 and 3) and nuclear glide bombs delivered by fighter-bomber aircraft, cruise
missiles (Babar and Ra’ad) to surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) launched from
surface ships. The 60 km range, Hatf-9, Nasr SRBM is claimed to be tipped with
a TNW.
India’s ‘credible minimum deterrence’ nuclear
doctrine professing a ‘no first use’ posture is predicated on massive
retaliation to a nuclear first strike. While the doctrine suffices to deter a
first strike on Indian cities due to the certainty of massive retaliation, its
efficacy in a contingency resulting in the use of TNWs against Indian troops on
Pakistani territory needs to be debated.
After the Pokhran tests of May 1998, a draft
nuclear doctrine was prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB)
headed by K Subrahmanyam. It was handed over to the government on 17 August
1999. The draft doctrine was debated within the government by various
stakeholders. After several meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Security
(CCS), the government issued a statement on 4 January 2003, spelling out
India’s nuclear doctrine and expressing satisfaction with the
operationalisation of its nuclear deterrent. The government statement included
the following salient features:
- India will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent; follow
a No First Use posture; and, will use nuclear weapons only “in retaliation
against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere”
- It was also affirmed that nuclear retaliation to a first strike
will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage
- Retaliatory attacks will be authorised only by the civilian
political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority
- Nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapon states
- India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in
the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons
- Continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile-related
materials and technologies, participation in FMCT negotiations, continued
moratorium on nuclear testing
- Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world,
through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament.
In the decade and a half since the nuclear doctrine
was unveiled by the government, several organisations and individuals have
commented on it. Some of them have been critical of the NFU posture. Among
them, Bharat Karnad (author of Nuclear Weapons and India’s Security, Macmillan,
2004) has consistently questioned the NFU posture. He has written: “NFU may be
useful as political rhetoric and make for stability in situations short of war.
But as a serious war-planning predicate, it is a liability. NFU is not in the least
credible, because it requires India to first absorb a nuclear attack before
responding in kind.”
Former PM Manmohan Singh, while speaking at the
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, on 2 April 2014,
called for a global ‘no first use’ norm. He said, “States possessing nuclear
weapons… [must] quickly move to the establishment of a global no-first-use
norm…” This was followed by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) promising in its
election manifesto to review India’s nuclear doctrine to “study in detail
India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to
challenges of current times…” and to “maintain a credible minimum deterrent
that is in tune with changing geostrategic realities.” Some BJP leaders hinted
that the NFU posture would also be reviewed. However, sensing the international
criticism that was bound to follow, Narendra Modi, BJP’s PM candidate,
emphasised that there would be ‘no compromise’ on no first use. Regardless of
election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important government policies must
be reviewed periodically with a view to examining and re-validating their key
features.
Criticism of the nuclear doctrine has mainly been
centred on the following key issues:
- The NFU posture is likely to result in unacceptably high initial
casualties and damage to Indian cities and infrastructure;
- The threat of ‘massive’ retaliation lacks credibility, especially
in retaliation to first use of TNWs against Indian forces on the
adversary’s own territory;
- Nuclear retaliation for a chemical or biological attack would be
illogical, as such attacks could be launched by non-state actors with or
without state support;
- And, it would be difficult to determine what constitutes a ‘major’
chemical or biological strike.
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said recently
that he wondered whether India’s nuclear doctrine should be constrained by a no
first use posture. He mentioned the advantages of unpredictability and said,
“If a written strategy exists…you are giving away your strength. Why should
India bind itself [to no first use]? India is a responsible nuclear power
and…[it should suffice to say that] we will not use nuclear weapons
irresponsibly.”
The essence of the Defence Minister’s introspection
was that ambiguity enhances deterrence. This view has been expressed by several
nuclear strategists. However, he emphasised several times that there was no
change in India’s nuclear doctrine and that he was expressing a personal view.
While he has been criticised, there can be no doubt that fresh thinking is
invaluable to the discourse on the subject.
As almost fourteen years have passed since the
doctrine was first enunciated, in the debate that followed the Defence
Minister’s comments on no first use, several analysts have suggested that the
nuclear doctrine needs to be reviewed. In fact, a review should be carried out
every five years. The government should initiate the process to review the
nuclear doctrine, but the review should not be confined to official circles
only. It should include a wider debate with participation by think-tanks and
individual analysts. Each facet pertaining to the doctrine must be discussed.
*Gurmeet Kanwal
Distinguished Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi
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